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MVń6VJ666*66666666PsFsFsFsFsFhjFcFcFcFcF6-6-6-6-sPsPsPsPsPsPsPsPsPsPsFsPsNsPsPsPZPsFsFsFjFjFjFjFsecFcFcFcFsPsPsPsPsPsPsPsP6-6-6-6-pZ=sPc-c@c-c6c-sPs^sPsPsPsPsj6j6j6Z=Z=Z=Z=cCc-c-sPsPsPsPsPsP–ssPcFcFcFsPc-sPj6Z=c-sPsPsesPsPcF6--sP4*PP/ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppN:``:JP6FPPPPšP-3zzP03zzPz066FFP 77`PP:``:ZZ 6F† 0«zz“  Pz `]VPZ``jjjj1ZVVVV VVZsssZ  PP P*r@]6Z#CMPs"‚u«Ü,ŁĄ‡a’’’’e’’’’’’^$(8<><q*«WWxxxWWkkxxx<xxxxåkkxxxk<((xxxxxWIxkWWWWWWWWWW(x€0€if€0 )’’µBä;åoßā ? !!? !! !! !!āĢą — ąą ļ ąą G ąą Ÿ ąą ÷ ąą O ąą § ąą ’ ą(1)ĢĢĢā  !! !!? !!? !!āSimilarly,€consumption€can€be€calculated:Ģßo€;+'h|Oģ_Ī= `€€¢0o )ÓĖ+> )µB“;åoßā p !!p !! !! !!āĢą Č ąą  ąą x ąą Š ąą ( ąą € ąą Ų ąą 0 ą(2)ĢĢā  !! !!p !!p !!āThis€equation€is€the€result€from€the€assumption€that€remaining€household€members€mustĻbe€able€to€compensate€the€shortfall€in€effort€if€a€daughter€is€married€to€anotherŠ (1Ē*/ Šhousehold.€Less€strong€assumptions€can€also€be€made,€as€long€as€a€decrease€inĻhousehold€members€increases€household€wealth€defined€either€as€the€household€surplusĻabove€minimum€consumption€as€average€consumption.€With€decreasing€returns€toĻhousehold€effort,€average€consumption€can€always€be€increased€by€reducing€the€numberĻof€household€members.€A€variation€looked€at€in€the€empirical€part€is€to€hypothesize€thatĻthe€consumption€of€females€is€a€proportion€of€household€production,€albeit€a€smallerĻproportion€than€other€household€members.€This€implies€that€wealthier€households€haveĻmore€to€gain€from€having€less€household€members€than€poorer€families,€which€isĻempirically€chequed.ĢHaving€established€a€simple€production€framework,€implicitly€present€in€previous€work,Ļmy€extension€is€to€consider€the€role€of€procreation€in€the€determination€of€dowry„pricesĻand€in€the€supporting€roles€of€societal€laws€guiding€the€dowry€system.€My€assumptionĻon€procreation€is€that€the€procreation€of€a€groom€is€ensured€as€soon€as€he€marries€aĻbride.€Although€this€assumes€that€the€only€positive€effect€of€women€on€household€utilityĻis€procreation€and€effort,€we€can€arbitrarily€extend€the€definition€of€the€utility€ofĻprocreation€to€take€account€of€other€utility€enhancing€aspects€that€women€bring€toĻhouseholds.€The€procreation€of€the€non„groom€deciding€household€is€assumed€to€occurĻas€soon€as€one€son€procreates.€The€main€reason€for€this€lies€with€the€observation€thatĻwhen€the€parents€get€old€in€rural€northern€India,€they€spend€the€remainder€of€their€lifeĻwith€only€one€of€their€married€sons,€who€supports€them.ĢWe€can€now€write€the€deciding€household's€total€life„time€utility€function:Ģßj€6&"h ,?żB@ `€€½_~’’µBJ;åjßā `!!`!! !! !!āĢ€€€€€€(3)ĢĢā  !! !!`!!`!!āThis€assumes€a€worst„case€scenario,€one€where€the€utility€of€daughters€is€not€directlyĻrelevant€for€the€utility€of€the€deciding€household.ĢWe€can€evaluate€what€the€transfer€of€a€daughter€between€two€households€means€for€bothĻhouseholds€in€terms€of€utility.ĢEffect€of€first€bride€entering€the€household:Ģßo€;+'h|Xž0 3 `€€l(#x~½_~µB;åoßā y!!y!! !! !!āĢ€(4)ĢĢā  !! !!y!!y!!āThe€arguments€in€the€different€individual€utilities€here€reflect€only€items€that€haveĻchanged€for€the€individual€concerned.€Thus€a€bride€for€one€son€does€not€make€the€otherĻsons€feel€they€have€procreated€although€consumption€and€effort€has€changed€for€all.€TheĻeffect€of€a€daughter€leaving€the€household€is€now:Ģßo€!;+'h|“ś+I `€€lm)x~l(#x~µBō;åoßā “!!“!! !! !!āą  ąą d ąĢą  ą€€€€€€(5)ĢĢā  !! !!“!!“!!āThe€next€modelling€problem€we€have€to€consider€is€why€households€do€not€all€kill€theirĻdaughters€or€neglect€them€fatally,€which€in€this€model€would€absolve€households€fromĻhaving€to€pay€a€dowry.€If€households€were€to€trade€one€daughter€for€a€bride,€this€wouldĻbe€a€classic€prisoners€dilemma:€each€of€the€two€households€would€have€an€incentive€toĻkill€their€daughter,€whilst€getting€a€bride€with€which€to€procreate€and€reap€the€utilityĻassociated€with€procreation.€From€game€theory€we€know€that€an€infinitely€repeatedĻprisoner's€dilemma€would€yield€a€cooperation€strategy.€This€would€however€only€holdĻif€households€trade€daughters,€whereas€this€in€reality€is€often€two€separate€transactionsĻwith€different€households.€Therefore,€the€bride€market€reduces€to€a€game€whereby€eachŠ (1Ē*/ Šhousehold€has€an€incentive€to€default€on€their€part,€i.e.€kill€their€daughters€or€fatallyĻneglect€them,€as€this€has€no€effect€upon€the€households€own€chance€of€procreation.€AĻstandard€case€of€externalities.€A€rational€household€can€however€expect€that€if€no€ruleĻprevents€feticide,€all€households€will€pursue€their€own€interest€and€no€women€would€beĻleft,€leaving€all€households€without€procreation.€One€solution€would€be€to€agree€to€aĻcollective€rule€banning€each€individual€household€from€killing€their€daughters.€Such€aĻrule€will€be€supported€by€a€household€if€this€raises€their€expected€utility:Ģßi€# 5%!h p†ó? `€€k.¦’ ’’µBč 0xißā §!!§!! !! !!āą ’ ąą W ąą Æ ąą  ą€€€€€€(6)ĢĢā  !! !!§!!§!!āCņņmaxóó€=€Cą P ąCņņminóó=c„kššCMŠ ’1  ŠEEņņmaxóó=EMą P ąEEņņminóó=EM„mššEIŠ {  ŠĢ/*€I€am€wondering€whether€to€add€terms€here€for€the€hight€of€dowry€prices.€As€dowriesĻare€merely€a€tranfer€of€money€from€one€household€to€another,€their€hight€is€in€essenceĻirrelevant€for€the€decision€to€have€women€or€not.€On€the€other€hand,€individual€familiesĻare€faced€with€net€transfers€depending€on€dowry„hight.€In€the€long€term€however,€eachĻfamily€can€expect€to€have€zero„transfers,€thus€assuming€that€in€the€long€term€m=k€mayĻsuffice€*/ĢĢĢDepending€on€the€collective€rule€for€adopting€laws€and€customs,€this€equation€gives€theĻconditions€for€each€individual€household€for€supporting€such€a€rule.€In€general,€a€ruleĻprohibiting€female€infanticide€can€be€supported€if€the€utility€of€procreating€isĻsufficiently€high,€at€least€higher€than€the€costs€of€maintaining€a€daughter\wife€for€life.ĻThis€however€poses€a€puzzle:€if€households€are€in€principle€prepared€to€pay€for€bridesĻand€there€are€at€least€as€many€men€as€women€of€fertile€ages,€why€aren't€there€at€leastĻas€many€households€willing€to€pay€for€a€bride€as€there€are€brides,€yielding€a€bride„priceĻin€stead€of€a€dowry?€One€possibility€arises€if€the€number€of€men€is€somehow€limitedĻdue€to€warfare,€religious€duties€or€widespread€celibacy.€In€the€absence€of€such€unlikelyĻanswers,€this€model€suggests€another€possibility:€although€individual€males€will€beĻinterested€in€their€own€procreation,€the€deciding€household€will€feel€it€has€procreatedĻif€they€have€at€least€one€son€who€has€procreated.€As€long€as€a€substantive€amount€ofĻmen€are€not€the€only€son€in€a€household,€there€will€not€be€enough€demand€for€bridesĻto€yield€a€positive€price.€Notice€that€having€two€or€more€daughters€does€not€have€suchĻan€effect:€two€daughters€are€simply€about€twice€the€cost€of€one€daughter.€More€formallyĻwe€can€summarise€these€arguments€by€comparing€the€utility€of€a€first€and€a€secondĻbride€for€a€household€with€two€sons.€The€utility€of€a€second€bride€equals:Ģßo€"+;+'h|rż=č@ `€€kŠ*’’ k.¦’ µB];åoßā “!!“!! !! !!āĢ€€€€€(7)ĢĢā  !! !!“!!“!!āIf€this€is€negative,€then€a€second€bride€(and€subsequent)€will€mean€an€effective€cost€toĻthe€household,€even€if€equation€(4)€reveals€that€the€household€benefits€from€having€allĻtheir€sons€marry€brides.ĢIn€order€to€see€what€the€actual€hight€of€the€dowry€will€be€for€different€households,€IĻnow€consider€two€different€matching€technologies:€a€one„try€Nash„bargaining€model€andĻa€no„search€costs€model€with€infinite€tries.ĢIn€the€first€matching€model,€I€consider€the€possibility€that€households€only€meet€oneĻother€family€whom€they€have€to€come€to€an€agreement€with€except€in€the€case€whenŠ (1Ē*/ Šthere€is€no€surplus€to€be€divided,€when€families€can€try€again.€This€can€be€seen€as€aĻmodel€with€extremely€high€search€costs.€As€in€labour„search€models,€the€two€householdĻwill€do€a€Nash„bargaining€over€the€surplus.€Assuming€perfect€information€about€eachĻothers€utility€function€and€given€the€bargaining€power€of€the€household€buying€(šš),€theŠ  » Šdowry€price€becomes€the€answer€to€the€following€problem:ĢĢMax€š!š€=(š šUņņbóó+P)ņņššóó(„š šUņņgóó„P)ņņ1„ššŠ × v ŠóóĢHere€š šUņņbóó€and€š šUņņgóó€denote€the€utility€effects€of€a€marriage€to€the€household€of€the€brideŠ © H Šand€the€household€of€the€groom€respectively,€which€are€given€by€equations€2€and€3€inĻcase€it€refers€to€a€first€marriage€for€the€receiving€household€and€equation€3€and€5Ļotherwise.ĢTaking€derivatives€with€respect€to€P€and€solving,€we€get€the€following€standardĻexpression:ĢĢDowry€price€=€„ššš šUņņgóó€+€(1„šš)š šUņņbó󀀩 §  ŠĢFrom€this€expression€we€can€deduce€that€the€dowry€price€will€generally€not€be€the€sameĻover€households€and€will€be€influenced€by€both€the€utility€of€the€family€of€the€bride€andĻthat€of€the€groom.€If€we€relax€the€assumption€that€the€household€of€the€bride€knowsĻwhether€the€family€of€the€groom€will€procreate€via€this€marriage,€we€will€get€a€Nash„¼ń3 ń¼ń3 ńbargaining€with€incomplete€information.€As€the€number€of€brothers€of€the€groom€isĻprobably€observable€for€the€family€of€the€bride,€they€can€take€that€as€an€indication€forĻthe€probability€that€the€family€of€the€groom€will€procreate€itself€with€this€marriage,Ļthereby€increasing€the€surplus€of€the€family€of€the€groom,€and€thus€decreasing€dowryĻprice.€Note€that€we€do€not€need€any€assumption€here€on€the€relative€amount€of€familiesĻwith€brides€and€those€with€grooms.ĢTwo€drawbacks€of€this€simple€model€is€1)€that€there€is€no€systematic€relationshipĻbetween€the€characteristics€of€the€two€households€and€2)€the€assumption€that€householdsĻhave€only€one€try€in€searching€marriages.€ĢĢTherefore,€I€consider€the€other€extreme€in€the€second€model€where€there€are€no€searchĻcosts€and€each€household€can€bargain€with€as€many€households€as€they€like.€As€theĻfemales€are€assumed€to€be€homogeneous,€this€reduces€to€a€standard€Walrasian€marketĻwith€one€price€for€all€brides.€We€can€now€use€equations€4€and€5€€to€give€implicitĻdemand€and€supply€functions€for€brides€if€we€summate€over€all€households€in€theĻeconomy.€In€the€demand€equations€we€summate€over€all€grooms.€Each€household€withĻmore€than€one€son€is€thus€considered€more€than€once.€For€the€supply€side€the€same€goesĻwith€respect€to€daughters.Ģßi€'.5%!h p ó `€€Ŗ,@p*’’µBŠ ;åißā A!!A!! !! !!āĢĢą ™ ąą ń ąą I ąą ” ąą ł ą(8)Ģßi€1-5%!h pśņ” `€€ßv/@p*Ŗ,@p*µBY ;åißĢā !!!!A!!A!!āĢą s ąą Ė ąą # ąą { ąą Ó ą(9)ĢĢā  !! !!!!!!āGiven€these€conditions,€we€can€now€summarise€the€model€by€showing€the€predictedĻdemand€and€supply€curves.Š (1Ē*/ ЇßW€% `Ąp-b  č!a’’Wßā    !! !!āĢAs€one€can€see€the€demand„curveĻfor€brides€changes€angle€at€the€pointĻthat€all€households€with€sons€haveĻone€married€son.€Thereafter,€theĻother€sons€cannot€call€upon€theĻresources€of€the€household€to€buyĻbrides.€On€the€supply€side,€there€is€aĻsimple€linear€curve,€denoting€theĻcosts€that€are€incurred€of€havingĻextra€members€to€the€household.€AtĻthe€point€where€all€daughters€areĻā  !! !!  āexhausted,€the€supply€curve€shoots€down.€From€the€demand€line,€we€can€see€that€aĻreduction€in€the€supply€of€females€will€have€little€effect€upon€dowry„prices€until€theĻpoint€that€all€men€with€married€brothers€are€unmarried.€If€laws€are€dependent€on€theĻtotal€net„benefit€to€deciding€households,€then€a€dowry€system€will€operate€as€long€asĻG>H.€ĢThe€main€difference€between€the€two€matching€technologies€is€that€the€hight€of€theĻdowry€price€is€independent€of€the€characteristics€of€the€trading€households€in€the€secondĻmodel,€whereas€it€is€directly€dependent€in€the€first€model.€Combinations€of€the€twoĻmodels,€with€reasonable€search€costs€and€limited€information,€will€thus€reach€toĻsituations€whereby€the€characteristics€of€the€two€households€have€some€influence€on€theĻhight€of€the€dowry.€Different€matching€technologies€might€however€give€completelyĻdifferent€predictions€on€the€relationship€between€the€household€characteristics.€OneĻeffect€of€search€is€that€selling€households€will€look€for€families€with€a€high€utility€ofĻa€bride€and€buying€households€will€look€for€families€who€have€a€very€low€utility€ofĻtheir€daughter,€as€this€will€improve€their€relative€bargaining€positions.€In€such€aĻsituation,€Burdett€and€Coles€(1994)€have€predicted€that€a€self„selection€will€occur:Ļselling€households€with€low€utility€of€brides€will€be€coupled€with€buying€househlds€whoĻhave€much€to€gain€from€a€bride.€One€ń4 ńempirical€ń4 ńprediction€coming€out€of€this€is€that€theĻage€of€the€bride€will€be€negatively€related€to€the€age€of€the€groom.€There€is€indeedĻsome€evidence€for€this€in€the€next€section,€where€I€look€at€some€estimates€of€theĻdeterminants€of€dowry€price€and€conclude€that€(household€characteristics€indeedĻinfluence€dowry€prices,€especially€household€wealth€and€the€number€of€brothers€in€theĻfamily€of€the€groom.....).€Bergstrom€and€Bagnoliń< ń€(1993)ń< ń€also€apply€the€priciple€of€high„¼ń< ń¼¼¼¼¼ń< ńquality„ń< ń¼¼ń< ńgets„high„quality€to€marriage€markets€where€they€predicted€that€wealthy€men€getĻthe€most€desirable€female.ĢA€final€modelling€problem€concerns€the€possibility€of€households€with€only€daughtersĻnot€to€marry€their€daughters€to€someone€else€but€to€let€them€take€on€the€role€ofĻprocreator€for€their€own€household,€without€a€marriage.€If€this€is€possible,€there€is€noĻreason€in€the€model€to€prevent€this€from€happening:€indeed€it€would€mean€that€theĻhousehold€has€one€mouth€less€to€feed€and€would€thus€be€beneficial€to€all€householdsĻwith€females,€creating€a€situation€in€which€men€are€the€mere€deliverers€of€geneticĻmaterial€and€superfluous€otherwise.€Reasons€why€this€does€not€occur€in€practise€willĻthus€have€to€assign€some€strategic€role€for€men,€such€as€guarding€property€if€propertyĻrights€are€not€well„established€or€holding€strategic€skills€useful€in€production,€asĻsuggested€by€Goody€(1976).€This€paper€takes€the€situation€as€given.ĢIn€analysing€what€happens€if€the€age€of€the€groom€and€the€bride€changes,€we€can€lookŠ (1Ē*/ Šat€equations€1€and€2,€where€we€can€tranlate€an€increase€in€the€age€of€the€individual€orĻgroup€by€giving€a€lower€T.€When€a€groom€gets€older,€the€value€of€the€consumption€ofĻthe€bride€for€the€individual€groom€will€decrease€because€he€has€less€time€to€enjoy€aĻhigher€consumption.€If€the€utility€of€procreation€is€however€consumed€as€soon€as€itĻhappens,€this€means€that€an€older€groom€will€more€readily€accept€a€lower€dowry.ĻDepending€on€the€influence€that€the€utility€of€the€groom€has€in€the€household€utilityĻfunction,€this€will€have€a€lowering€effect€on€the€dowry„size.€Therefore€groom„age€andĻdowry€can€be€seen€as€partial€substitutes.€The€model€would€suggest€that€this€effect€willĻbe€especially€large€if€the€older€groom€is€an€only€son.€If€the€age€of€the€groom€and€thatĻof€his€non„groom€deciding€household€are€correlated,€we€should€get€an€even€strongerĻnegative€relationship€between€groom€age€and€dowry.ĢWhen€the€age€of€the€bride€decreases,€something€different€happens:€the€householdĻ"selling"€its€bride€will€have€a€shorter€period€in€which€to€feed€their€daugther,€whilst€theĻreceiving€household€will€not€incur€increased€costs,€as€the€costs€depend€on€the€age€of€theĻindividuals€in€the€receiving€household,€not€the€age€of€the€bride.€Household€members€areĻnot€bothered€by€the€consumption€of€the€bride€after€they€have€died,€only€the€consumptionĻbefore€they€die.€As€brides€generally€will€outlive€the€members€of€the€deciding€household,Ļthe€age€of€the€bride€is€not€important€for€the€household€of€the€groom,€only€their€ownĻage.€This€helps€explain€why€the€age€of€the€bride€in€India€is€about€10€years€below€theĻage€of€the€groom€in€rural€India:€although€it€makes€no€difference€on€total€consumption,Ļeach€individual€household€has€an€incentive€to€mary€of€their€daughters€at€a€young€ageĻand€marry€their€sons€at€an€older€age€as€that€would€minimize€the€time€they€would€haveĻto€feed€females.ĢSeen€in€this€light,€Vijayendra's€(1993)€argument€that€dowries€should€rise€in€anĻincreasing€population€as€the€number€of€young€females€relative€to€old€males€increases,Ļmisses€the€point€that€the€difference€in€ages€between€brides€and€groom€is€the€effect€ofĻland„pressure€(and€thus€dowry€increases),€not€the€cause.€ĢĢĢņņņ ņ2.€ą ų ąEmpirical€analysisó óŠ Ę e ŠóóĢThe€empirical€side€of€this€paper€uses€the€ICRISAT€data€set,€which€is€a€survey€of€*Ļhouseholds€in€6€villages€in€Northern€rural€India.€The€main€empirical€questions€arisenĻabove€are€the€relationship€between€the€hight€of€dowry€and€the€characteristics€of€theĻhouseholds€involved.€In€Table€1€we€see€the€results€of€the€estimation.ĢĢWe€see€that,€contrary\according€to€our€expectations,€dowry€is€affectedĻpositively\negatively€with€a)€bride's€family€wealth€(explained€as€females€will€consumeĻmore),€b)€minus€groom's€family€wealth€(which€will€increase€consumption€of€females),Ļc)€the€number€of€young€males€in€the€family€of€the€groom,€d)€minus€groom's€age.€ĢĢĢņņņ ņ3.€ą ų ąAssumptions€and€predictionsó óŠ Ć,b&* ŠóóĢThe€above€model€and€empirical€estimations€show€that€dowry€can€be€understood€as€anĻintricate€system€of€economic€circumstances€and€social€rules.€To€summarise,€theĻfollowing€"ingredients"€lead€to€our€dowry€model:Š 0.*. Š„€gender€based€control€of€land,€jobs€and€wealthĢ„€marginal€productivity€of€an€extra€worker€to€be€below€minimum€consumption€level.ĻMarginal€productivity€of€an€extra€hour€is€near€zero.Ģ„€less€households€with€sons€than€the€total€amount€of€daughters€as€one€should€otherwiseĻsee€a€negative€dowry.€This€requires€a€substantial€amount€of€households€with€more€thanĻone€son.Ģ„€a€superstructure€which€prevents€non„marriage€of€daughters€in€case€of€households€withĻno€sons€as€such€households€have€an€incentive€to€let€the€daughters€take€on€the€completeĻrole€of€procreation€without€a€marriageĢĢą ų ąņ ņPredictions€of€the€modeló óŠ {  Š„€those€households€less€interested€in€procreation€will€want€to€extract€higher€dowries€andĻwill€be€less€interested€in€the€bride's€welfare.€Perhaps€this€applies€to€city€households€whoĻdo€not€have€a€plot€of€land€to€defend.€Families€with€more€than€one€son€are€also€potentialĻcandidates.Ģ„€if€the€age€of€the€groom€is€high,€there€is€less€time€to€support€a€wife,€thus€dowries€canĻbe€lower€if€the€chance€of€procreation€remains€high€enough.Ģ„€if€females€have€sources€of€income€to€contribute€to€household€wealth,€the€pressure€forĻdowries€should€become€less.Ģ„€if€the€age€of€the€bride€is€low,€one€sees€an€increase€in€the€costs€of€supporting€moreĻpersons€in€a€household.€If€the€chances€of€procreation€only€improve€only€marginally€withĻlower€bridal€age€one€would€expect€a€higher€dowry€to€be€the€result.Ģ„€dowries€will€be€greatest€in€areas€where€land€pressure€is€greatest€and€where€males€haveĻa€strategic€advantage€over€women€in€terms€of€their€contribution€to€agriculture€to€dueĻhigher€physical€strength.ĢĢą ų ąņ ņConclusionsó óŠ  Ŗ ŠThis€paper€has€tried€to€provide€a€simple€model€with€which€to€study€the€underlyingĻeconomic€incentives€for€a€dowry€system.€It's€results€and€predictions€closely€resembleĻearlier€findings€that€dowries€increase€when€land€pressure€increases€and€that€the€age€ofĻthe€groom€and€the€hight€of€the€dowry€can€be€trade„offs.€The€fact€that€brides€are€muchĻyounger€than€grooms€has€also€been€explained€by€pointing€to€the€fact€that€marrying€aĻdaugther€at€a€young€age€has€a€positive€effect€for€the€household€selling€the€bride,€but€hasĻno€effect€on€the€household€buying€the€bride,€as€the€members€of€the€receiving€householdĻare€only€interested€in€the€amount€that€a€bride€consumes€during€their€own€lives€and€areĻthus€uninterested€whether€a€bride€outlives€them€by€five€or€fifty€years.€ĢTherefore€lower€ages€of€brides€may€be€a€reaction€to€increasing€land€pressure€as€it€meansĻfor€households€getting€rid€of€an€expense€earlier.€The€model€does€however€make€clearĻthat€the€system€can€only€work€if€effort€is€not€highly€valued€and€if€a€superstructure€existsĻwhich€polices€several€"escape€routes"€for€households€for€whom€the€dowry„system€is€notĻoptimal.€As€dowry€has€been€forbidden€by€law€for€over€XX€years€in€India,€this€must€beĻa€textbook€example€of€an€economic€system€which€is€not€governed€by€laws,€but€byĻreligious€beliefs,€cultural€practice€and€intense€social€pressure€in€conjunction€withĻeconomic€circumstances.€The€only€really€new€insight€of€the€model€is€that€it€predicts€thatĻthe€hight€of€dowries€will€only€start€decreasing€rapidly€if€the€number€of€brides€equals€theĻtotal€amount€of€households€with€sons,€as€that€defines€the€point€when€the€household€ofĻthe€groom€becomes€interested€in€the€procreation€role€of€the€bride€and€will€be€preparedĻto€make€economic€sacrifices€in€order€to€ensure€the€continuation€of€the€household.€Š (1Ē*/ ŠAlthough€this€paper€has€considered€a€rural€situation,€the€model€can€also€be€applied€toĻurban€situations€where€an€infinite€job„security€exists:€a€job„security€system€whereby€aĻfather€has€the€right€to€pass€on€his€job€to€one€of€his€sons€perpetuates€the€male„basedĻaccess€to€revenue„earning€and€wealth€which€operates€on€the€countryside.ĢĢą ų ąą P ąņ ņLiteratureŠ ī  Šń? ńó óĢBergstrom,€T.B.,€Bagnoli,€M.€(1993),€"Courtship€as€a€waiting€game",€ņņńD ńJPEóó,€101(1),€pp.Š Ą _ Š185„202.ńE ńńF ńŌ% € ŌńF ńńE ńĢBurdett.€K.,€Coles,€M.G.€(March€1994),€"Marriage€and€class",€University€of€Essex,Ļunpublished.ĢDharmalingam,€A.€(1994),€"Economics€of€marriage€in€a€South€Indian€Village",ĻņņDevelopments€and€Changeóó,€25(3),€pp.€569„590.Š Oī  ŠGoody,€J.€(1976),€ņņProduction€and€reproductionóó,€Cambridge€University€Press:€New€YorkŠ :Ł  ŠHarris,€M.€(1993),€ņņCulture,€people,€natureóó,€Harpers€Collins:€New€YorkŠ %Ä  ŠMiller,€B.€(1987),€"Female€infanticide€and€child€neglect€in€rural€North€India"€inĻScheper„Hughes,€N.€(ed.),€ņņChild€Survivalóó,€Boston:€D.€Redidel,€pp.€95„112.Š ł˜ ŠShah,€T.,€Srinivasan,€B.€(1994),€"€€",€in€Duggan,€P.,€Dashner,€H.€(eds.),€"Women's€livesĻin€the€new€global€economy",€notebook€for€study€and€research,€no.€22,€Amsterdam:ĻņņInternational€Institute€for€Research€and€Educationóó,€pp.€Š ¶U ŠSharma,€U.€(1983),€"Dowry€in€North€India:€its€consequences€for€women",€in€Hirschon,ĻR.€(ed.),€ņņWomen€and€Propertyóó,€Croom€Helm:€London,€pp.€62„74.Š Š) ŠVijayendra,€R.€(1993a),€"Dowry€'inflation'€in€rural€India:€a€statistical€investigation",€ņņŠ u ŠPopulation€Studiesóó,€pp.€283„293.Š ^ż ŠVijayendra,€R.€(1993b),€"The€rising€price€of€husbands:€a€hedonic€analysis€of€dowryĻincreases€in€rural€India",€ņņJournal€of€Political€Economicsóó,€pp.€666„677.Š 2Ń ŠĢĢą ų ąą P ąņ ņCurrent€thinking:ó óŠ ļŽ ŠA€third€search€model€could€assume€that€households€know€about€the€characteristics€ofĻall€other€households€and€can€refuse€to€come€to€an€agreement,€although€they€do€incurĻfixed€search€costs.€Each€household€is€then€assumed€to€have€the€same€probability€ofĻmeeting€another€household€in€each€period€and€can€agree€to€go€into€a€Nash„bargainingĻor€to€refuse€to€bargain€and€wait€untill€a€future€period.€Households€then€accept€an€offerĻto€bargain€depending€on€their€expectation€of€meeting€a€household€with€a€higher€surplusĻin€future€periods.€How€would€this€work:Ģ„€selling€household€perceives€an€arrival€rate€of€randomly€selected€buyers.€If€utility€ofĻsale€remains€stable€over€time,€this€would€have€the€standard€reservation€wage€property.ĻThe€same€will€go€for€the€selling€housholds:€a€two„sided€reservation€wages€game,€whichĻagain€will€have€the€property€that€households€with€relatively€much€to€gain€from€a€saleĻwill€be€coupled.€The€problem€of€having€to€specify€the€number€of€selling€and€buyingĻhouseholds€per€period€may€be€solved€by€assuming€equal€numbers.€Both€types€ofĻhouseholds€will€thus€face€equal€meeting€rates.€The€problem€comes€in€when€we€considerĻthat€utility€of€a€transfer€is€not€time„invariant€in€this€model:€the€selling€household€willĻhave€to€feed€the€daughter€in€the€meanwhile,€leading€to€a€clear€cost€and€thus€to€a€movingĻreservation€wage€(the€reservation€wage€increases€over€time€as€a€deal€carries€less€utility,Ļproviding€that€there€is€no€point€when€females€are€seen€as€too€old€to€be€consideredŠ Q0š). Š(why??)).€The€buying€household€will€however€not€face€costs€and€thus€increase€theirĻreservation€wage,€which€raises€the€question€why€they€are€in€the€market€at€all€if€they€canĻwait?€One€obvious€way€of€dealing€with€this€has€many€modelling€problems:Ģą0 ų ą„€one€could€postulate€that€the€chance€of€procreation€decreases€with€the€age€of€theĻgroom.€Waiting€thus€has€a€cost.€When€the€marginal€costs€of€waiting€and€feedingĻa€bride€are€about€equal,€grooms€will€enter€the€market.€Deriving€properties€fromĻthe€utility€functions€will€however€be€a€long€haul€with€relatively€little€reward.Š ų!!ų!! ŠMaybe€I€could€assume€my€way€out€of€this,€by€making€the€above€arguments€and€simplyĻstate€that€search€carries€costs,€but€not€time€(search€time€zero,€number€of€times€a€matchĻis€considered€does€carry€a€cost).€Households€are€then€simply€assumed€to€enter€theĻmarket€at€their€optimal€moment.ĢFortunately€this€model€resembles€the€marriage€model€of€Burdett€and€Coles€(1994),€whoĻclaim€that€parties€will€self„select€into€groups€with€high€surplus€and€low€surplus,€whichĻis€perfectly€testable.ń0 ńĢń0 ńń2 ń